J. R. Scarth v. G. Barton Blackstock : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
J. R. Scarth v. G. Barton Blackstock : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. R. Scarth; Pro Se Appellee.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Thom D. Roberts; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Scarth v. Blackstock, No. 920580 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3554
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
J. 
V . 
G. 
R. Scarth, 
Petitioner and 
Appellee, 
Barton Blackstock, 
Respondent and : 
Appellant. 
APPELLEE'S 
: BRIEF 
; Case No. 920580-CA 
Priority No. 16 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, PRESIDING. 
J. R. SCARTH, pro se 
Petitioner/Appellee 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-
5278 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
Thorn D. Roberts 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
FILED 
J UN 281993 
COURT OF APPFAl Q 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
THE RELEVANT UTAH CODE PROVISION DOES NOT 
EMPOWER THE UTAH DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION TO 
EXTEND THE SUSPENSION PERIOD BEYOND 120 
FROM 30 DAYS AFTER THE ARREST OF APPELLEE. 5 
WITH THE STATUTORY SUSPENSION PERIOD HAVING 
PASSED, THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT IS 
MOOT 7 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REQUEST A HEARING ON 
HIS MOTION TO VACATE TEMPORARY ORDER AND 
NEVER REQUESTED A HEARING ON HIS MOTION AND 
THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE HEARD TO COMPLAIN 
ABOUT THE EXTENDED TIME THE TEMPORARY ORDER 
OF REINSTATEMENT WAS IN EFFECT 8 
CONCLUSION 10 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) 2 
Richens v*. Schwendiman, 802 P. 2d 108 (Utah App. 1990) 7 
State Vi Trafnv, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990) 10 
State v± Hoyt, 806 P. 2d 204 (Utah App. 1991) . . . . 10 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2A-3(2) (a)(1992) 1 
Utah Code Ann. section 41-2-130 (7)(Cum. Supp. 1992) 1, 
2,4,6,10 
RULES 
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration . . 1,8,9, 
ii 
J. R. Scarth pro se (2870) 
Appellee and Petitioner 
76 N. Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
(801) 644-5278 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
J. R. Searth, 
Petitioner and 
Appellee, 
v. 
G. Barton Blackstock, 
Respondent and 
Appellant. 
APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 920580-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals is grounded 
in Utah Code Annotated, section 78-2A- 3(2)(a) (1992). 
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was the Trial Court empowered to extend the 
suspension period beyond the time allowed by statute? 
Section 41-2-130(7)(1988), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. 
Has the issue raised by Appellant been rendered 
moot by the passage of time? Section 41-1-130(7)(1988), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
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Did the Appellant fail to pursue available remedies 
and thus foreclose himself from complaining at this late 
date? Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration. 
The Appellant has challenged a conclusion of law 
made by the Trial Court and this Court should review the 
matter on a "correctness" standard. Reinbold v. Utah 
Fun Shares, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND RULE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann., section 41-2-130 (7) (1988): 
* * * 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under this 
subsection is for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 
31st day after arrest. 
* * * 
Rule 4-501(d) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration provides in its relevant part as follows: 
* * * 
Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration 
of the five-day period to file 
a memorandum, either party may notify the 
Clrrk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision. The notification shall be in the form of 
a separate written pleading and 
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." 
The notification shall contain a notice of 
mailing to all parties. If neither party 
files a notice, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision. 
* * * 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
This is an appeal from a portion of the final 
judgment of the Sixth Judicial District Court for Kane 
County, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding, arising 
from a trial de novo upon Appellee's Petition for 
Reinstatement of Driving Privilege and Drivers License 
following a ruling adverse to Appellee by a hearing 
officer at a per se hearing of the Utah Drivers License 
Division. 
Appellee sought a trial de novo following the 
administrative action of Appellant suspending 
Petitioner's driving privilege for a period of 120 days, 
commencing March 11, 1992. Appellee filed his Verified 
Petition seeking temporary and permanent relief from 
said suspension on April 7, 1992. (R-40) On April 24, 
1992, the Trial Court entered its Temporary Order 
reinstating Appellee's driving privilege pending trial. 
(R-38) 
Trial de novo was held on June 25, 1992, and the 
Trial Court immediately vacated its temporary order and 
ordered the Appellant's suspension order reinstated, 
ruling that the suspension period would expire at the 
conclusion of July 9, 1992, the original suspension 
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period. (R-5) Respondent has appealed that portion of 
the Trial Court's final judgment declaring that the 
suspension period would end on July 9, 1992, claiming 
that the Trial Court erred and should have added an 
additional 66 days suspension from June 25, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 41-2-130 (7), Utah Code Annotated, (1988), 
provides for a 120 day suspension, beginning on the 31st 
day after the arrest and does not give the Court 
latitude to extend the suspension period. 
The statutory suspension period has long since 
expired and the Appellee has been with out a drivers 
license for 54 days plus in excess of six months and 
therefore, the issue is moot. See Affidavit of 
Appellee, infra. 
The Appellant should not be heard to complain when 
he failed to exercise any of the available means to 
obtain a prompt ruling on his Motion in Re: Temporary 
Order Reinstating Driving Privilege wherein he prayed 
the Trial Court to set aside its temporary order. (R-
20-30) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RELEVANT UTAH CODE SECTION DOES NOT EMPOWER THE 
COURT TO EXTEND THE SUSPENSION PERIOD BEYOND 120 DAYS 
FROM 30 DAYS AFTER THE ARREST OF APPELLEE. 
On February 10, 1992, Petitioner was arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and agreed to 
submit to an intoxilyzer examination. As a result of 
the arrest and intoxilyzer results, the Utah Drivers 
License Division scheduled a suspension hearing, at 
which Petitioner, the officer and witnesses attended and 
testified with an employee of the Division presiding. 
After the hearing, the Division entered its Order 
suspending Petitioner's driving privilege for a period 
of 120 days, commencing March 11, 1992. (R-40) 
Thereafter and on April 20, 1992, Petitioner 
obtained from the Sixth Judicial District Court a 
Temporary Order Reinstating Driving Privileges and 
Driver's License. (R-38) 
Petitioner filed his Verified Petition herein on 
April 7, 1992, and mailed a copy of the same to the Utah 
Attorney General on the same day.(R-40-44) Petitioner's 
ExParte Motion for Temporary Order was filed on April 
16, 1992, and a copy of the motion was mailed to the 
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office of the Utah Attorney General Office on April 16, 
1992.(R-34) The District Court's temporary order 
reinstating Petitioner's driving privileges was entered 
on April 24, 1992, and a copy was mailed to the Office 
of the Utah Attorney General on April 22, 1992.(R-38-39) 
Respondent filed his Response to Temporary Order on 
April 27, 1992.(R-34-36) 
Respondent filed his Motion In Re: Temporary 
Order Reinstating Driving Privileges together with 
Memorandum on May 4, 1992.(R-20-30) Respondent never 
noticed said Motion for hearing. Respondent never filed 
a notice to submit (his motion) for decision. 
Respondent never requested a hearing date and never 
filed a notice of readiness for trial. 
At trial on the matter held on June 25, 1992, the 
trial court sustained the suspension, and vacated the 
temporary order, ruling that the suspension period would 
end on July 9,1992, which was 120 days from 30 days 
after the Petitioner was arrested. 
The relevant portion of section 41-2-130 (7), Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended) (1991 Edition) is as 
follows: 
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* * * 
A second or subsequent suspension under this 
subsection is for 120 days, beginning on the 
31st day after the date of arrest. 
There is no language in the Utah Code subsection 
quoted immediately above that empowers the Court to 
extend the suspension of Petitioner's driving 
privilege beyond 150 days after the date of his 
arrest. The language of said code section is 
unequivocal, without ambiguity and leaves no room 
for misunderstanding. The Court simply is not 
empowered to extend the suspension beyond the 
period authorized by the legislature. 
POINT il 
WITH THE STATUTORY SUSPENSION PERIOD HAVING 
PASSED, THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT IS MOOT. 
The 120 suspension period expired on July 9, 1992, 
rendering the present appeal moot. In Richens v. 
Schwendiman. 802 P.2d 108 (Utah App. 1990), where the 
petitioners' appealed the Division's revocation of their 
drivers' license, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that 
because the one year revocation period had passed, that 
the issues were moot and dismissed the appeals. At page 
110 of the Richens opinion, id., this Court wrote the 
following: 
* * * 
Utah Courts have consistently refused to 
hear the merits of driver's license 
revocation appeals rendered moot because 
the revocation period has expired. 
* * * 
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On December 8, 1992, the Honorable Patricia L. 
Chavez of the Kanab City Justice Court, at sentencing in 
a DUI case arising out of the same facts as those in the 
instant case ordered Appellee to surrender his Utah 
Drivers License to the Court and Appellee did so. 
(Affidavit of Appellee dated March 24, 1993, and filed 
with the Utah Court of Appeals) Thus, Appellee has 
been without a drivers license for the last six and one 
half months. This fact alone may render this appeal 
moot. 
Add that fact to the fact that the statutory 
suspension period has expired and it is apparent that 
Appellant's appeal should be dismissed. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REQUEST A HEARING ON 
HIS MOTION TO VACATE TEMPORARY ORDER AND 
NEVER FILED A NOTICE OF READINESS FOR TRIAL 
AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE HEARD TO 
COMPLAIN ABOUT THE EXTENDED TIME THE TEMPORARY 
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT WAS IN EFFECT. 
Rule 4-501 (d) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration provides as follows: 
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* # • 
Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file 
a memorandum, either party may notify the 
Clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision. The notification shall be in the 
form of a separate written pleading and 
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." 
The notification shall contain a notice of 
mailing to all parties. If neither pa?ty 
files a notice, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision. (emphasis added) 
Respondent's attorney filed Respondent's Motion in 
Re: Temporary Order Reinstating Driving Privileges and 
Driver's License, which in reality was a motion to 
vacate the temporary order, together with memorandum, on 
May 4, 1992. (R-20-30) However, he never filed a notice 
of hearing the same and never filed a "Notice to Submit 
for Decision* pursuant to said Rule 4-501 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. Furthermore, he never filed a 
notice of readiness for trial. In other words 
Respondent took no action to get the temporary order 
vacated. 
Respondent was dilatory in that respect and is 
responsible for allowing Petitioner to drive pursuant to 
the temporary order for an extended period of time. 
However, it should be remembered that at trial, the 
Court vacated the temporary order and reinstated the 
Division's Order of Suspension. 
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A party should not be heard to complain on an appeal 
when he failed to use due diligence to bring a matter 
before the Court to correct what he perceives to be 
improper. In other words, the Respondent "failed to 
assert his right." The line of cases on the issue of 
the right to a speedy trial, are by illustration, 
enlightening on this issue. See State v. Trafny, 799 P. 
2d 704, (Utah 1990) and State v^ Hoyt. 806 P.2d 204 
(Utah App. 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
The language of section 41-2-130 (7) Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, is clear 
and limits the suspension of Petitioner's driving 
privilege to 120 days from thirty (30) days after the 
day of his arrest. Said code section does not empower 
the Court to extend the period of suspension beyond the 
period set by the legislature. 
The statutory suspension period having expired, the 
issue raised by Respondent on appeal is moot. 
Respondent filed his Motion in Re: Temporary Order 
Reinstating Driving Privileges on May 4, 1992, and 
then sat back and did nothing to bring the matter before 
the Court. (R-20-30) It was his responsibility to bring 
his Motion before the Court and he simply never did 
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anything to cause the Trial Court to rule on the matter, 
As a result, the Respondent should not be heard to 
complain, where he has failed to take available steps 
to timely bring the matter before the trial court for 
resolution. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that 
Respondent's appeal should be dismissed. 
DATED this yZvliay of June, 1993. 
3^ ZL-^l^^^i Jtf. R. Scarth, Appellee and 
Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this </7 day of June, 
1993, I mailed four (4) true, full and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing BRIEF, with first-class postage 
thereon fully prepaid to: Thorn D. Roberts Assistant 
Attorney General at 236 State Capital Bldg., Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114. 
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